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support.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Estimation of international trade ﬂows has a long tradition. Tinbergen (1962) pioneered
the use of gravity equations in empirical speciﬁcations of bilateral trade ﬂows, in which the
volume of trade between two countries is proportional to the product of an index of their
economic size, and the factor of proportionality depends on measures of "trade resistance"
between them. Among the measures of trade resistance, he included geographic distance, a
dummy for common borders, and dummies for Commonwealth and Benelux memberships.
Tinbergen’s speciﬁcation has been widely used, simply because it provides a good ﬁtt om o s t
data sets of regional and international trade ﬂows. And over time, his approach has been
furnished with theoretical underpinnings and better estimation techniques.1
While the accurate estimation of international trade ﬂows is important for an understand-
ing of the structure of world trade, the accuracy of such estimates and their interpretation
have gained added signiﬁcance as a result of their wide use in various branches of the empirical
literature. These studies rely on measures of trade openness as instruments in the estimation
of the impact of economic and political variables on economic success. Much of this work
builds on Frankel and Romer (1999), who studied the impact of trade openness on income per
capita in a large sample of countries. Their methodology consists of estimating a ﬁrst-stage
gravity equation of bilateral trade ﬂows, which includes indexes of geographic characteristics
(size of area, whether a country is landlocked, and whether the two countries have a common
border) and bilateral distances. The predicted trade volume from this equation is then used
as a measure of trade openness in a second-stage equation that estimates the impact of trade
openness on income per capita. They found a large and signiﬁcant eﬀect.2
Hall and Jones (1999) used instrumental variables to estimate the impact of social in-
frastructure on income per capita. They combined an index of government anti-diversion
policies and the fraction of years in which a country was open according to the Sachs and
Warner (1995) index to measure social infrastructure.3 Among the instruments they included
the Frankel and Romer (1999) measure of trade openness. Evidently, the accuracy of the es-
timates from the Frankel—Romer ﬁrst-stage equation aﬀects the accuracy of the estimates in
the second-stage equation, including the margin a li m p a c to fs o c i a li n f r a s t r u c t u r eo ni n c o m e
per capita.
Persson and Tabellini (2003) also used instrumental variables, but they used this method
to estimate the impact of political institutions on productivity and growth. They found that
in well-established democracies economic policies are more growth-oriented in presidential
1See, for example, Anderson (1979) , Helpman and Krugman (1985), Helpman (1987), Feenstra (2002),
and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).
2In the working paper that preceded the published version of their paper, Frankel and Romer (1996) used
the same methodology to study the impact of openness on the rate of growth of income per capita. They
f o u n das t r o n gp o s i t i v ee ﬀect.
3The index of government anti-diversion policies aggregates measures of law and order, bureaucratic quality,
corruption, risk of expropriation, and government repudiation of contracts.
1than in parliamentary systems, while in weak democracies economic policies are more growth-
oriented in parliamentary systems. Similarly to Hall and Jones (1999), they used the Frankel—
Romer instrument of trade openness to reach this conclusion. Therefore, in this case too, the
quality of the ﬁrst-stage gravity equation aﬀects the quality of the second-stage estimates of
the impact of political institutions on economic performance.
These examples illustrate the prominent role of the gravity equation in areas other than
international trade. In the area of international trade this equation has dominated empirical
research. It has been used to estimate the impact on trade ﬂows of international borders,
preferential trading blocs, currency unions, membership in the WTO, as well as the size of
home-market eﬀects.4
All the above mentioned studies estimate the gravity equation on samples of countries that
have only positive trade ﬂows between them. We argue in this paper that, by disregarding
countries that do not trade with each other, these studies give up important information
contained in the data, and they produce biased estimates as a result. We also argue that
standard speciﬁcations of the gravity equation impose symmetry that is inconsistent with the
data, and that this too biases the estimates. To correct these biases, we develop a theory
that predicts positive as well as zero trade ﬂows between countries, and use the theory to
derive estimation procedures that exploit the information contained in data sets of trading
and non-trading countries alike.5
The next section brieﬂy reviews the evolution of the volume of trade among the 161
countries in our sample, and the composition of country pairs according to their trading
status.6 Three features stand out. First, about half of the country pairs do not trade with
one-another.7 Second, the rapid growth of world trade from 1970 to 1997 was predominantly
due to the growth of the volume of trade among countries that traded with each other in
1970 rather than due to the expansion of trade among new trade partners. Third, the average
volume of trade at the end of the period between pairs of countries that exported to one-
another in 1970 was much larger than the average volume of trade at the end of the period
of country pairs with a diﬀerent trade status. Nevertheless, we show in Section 6 that the
volume of trade between pairs of countries that traded with one-another was signiﬁcantly
inﬂuenced by the fraction of ﬁrms that engaged in foreign trade, and that this fraction varied
4See McCallum (1995) for the study that triggered an extensive debate on the role of international borders,
as well as Wei (1996), Evans (2003), and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). Feenstra (2003, chap. 5) provides
an overview of this debate. Also see Frankel (1997) on preferential trading blocs, Rose (2000) and Tenreyro
and Barro (2002) on currency unions, Rose (2004) on WTO membership, and Davis and Weinstein (2003) on
the size of home-market eﬀects.
5Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), Evenett and Venables (2002), and Haveman and Hummels (2004)
all highlight the prevalence of zero bilateral trade ﬂows and suggest theoretical interpretations for them.
We provide a theoretical framework that jointly determines both the set of trading partners and their trade
volumes, and we develop estimation procedures for this model.
6See appendix A for data sources and for the list of the 161 countries.
7We say that a country pair i and j does not trade with one-another if i d o e sn o te x p o r tt oj and j does
n o te x p o r tt oi.
2systematically with country characteristics. Therefore the intensive margin of trade was
substantially driven by variations in the fraction of trading ﬁrms, but not by new trading
partners.
We develop in Section 3 the theoretical model that motivates our estimation procedures.
This is a model of international trade in diﬀerentiated products in which ﬁrms face ﬁxed
and variable costs of exporting, along the lines suggested by Melitz (2003). Firms vary by
productivity, and only the more productive ﬁrms ﬁnd it proﬁtable to export. Moreover, the
proﬁtability of exports varies by destination; it is higher to countries with higher demand
levels, lower variable export costs, and lower ﬁxed export costs. As a result, to every destina-
tion country i, there is a marginal exporter in country j that just breaks even by exporting to
i.C o u n t r yj ﬁrms with higher productivity than the marginal exporter have positive proﬁts
from exporting to i.
This model has a number of implications for trade ﬂows. First, it allows all ﬁrms in a
country j to choose not to export to a country i, because it is possible for no ﬁrm in j to have
productivity above the threshold that makes exports to i proﬁtable. The model is therefore
able to predict zero exports from j to i for some country pairs. As a result, the model is
consistent with zero trade ﬂows in both directions between some countries, as well as zero
exports from j to i but positive exports from i to j for some country pairs. Both types of
trade patterns exist in the data. Second, the model predicts positive trade ﬂows in both
directions for some country pairs, which is also needed in order to explain the data. And
ﬁnally, the model generates a gravity equation.
Our derivation of the gravity equation generalizes the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003)
equation in two ways. First, it accounts for ﬁrm heterogeneity and ﬁxed trade costs. Second,
it accounts for asymmetries between the volume of exports from j to i and the volume of
exports from i to j. Both are important for data analysis. We also develop a set of suﬃcient
conditions under which more general forms of the Anderson-van Wincoop equations aggregate
trade ﬂows across heterogeneous ﬁrms facing both ﬁxed and variable trade costs.
Section 4 develops the empirical framework for estimating the gravity equation derived in
Section 3. We propose a two stage estimation procedure. The ﬁrst stage consists of estimating
a Probit equation that speciﬁes the probability that country j exports to i as a function
of observable variables. The speciﬁcation of this equation is derived from the theoretical
model and an explicit introduction of unobservable variations. Predicted components of this
equation are then used in the second stage to estimate the gravity equation in log-linear
form. We show that this procedure yields consistent estimates of the parameters of the
gravity equation, such as the marginal impact of distance between countries on their exports
to one-another.8 It simultaneously corrects for two types of potential biases: a Heckman
selection bias and a bias from potential asymmetries in the trade ﬂo w sb e t w e e np a i r so f
8We also show that consistency requires the use of separate country ﬁxed eﬀects for exporters and importers,
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Trade in both directions Trade in one direction only  No trade
Figure 1: Distribution of country pairs among pairs trading in both directions, pairs trading
in one direction only, and nontrading pairs: 12,880 pairs constructed form 161 countries,
1970-1997
countries. Since this procedure is easy to implement, it can be eﬀectively used in many
application, such as instrumental variables estimation of the impact of political variables on
economic outcomes.
It is interesting to note that despite the fact that our theoretical model has ﬁrm hetero-
geneity, we do not need ﬁrm-level data to estimate the gravity equation. This stems from
the fact that the features of marginal exporters can be identiﬁed from the variation in the
characteristics of the destination countries. That is, for every country j, its exports to diﬀer-
ent countries vary by the characteristics of the importers. As a result, there exist suﬃcient
statistics, which can be computed from aggregate data, that predict the volume of exports
of heterogeneous ﬁrms.9
Section 5 shows that variables that are commonly used in gravity equations also aﬀect the
probability that two countries trade with each other. This provides evidence for a potential
bias in the standard estimates. The extent of this bias is then studied in Section 6.
9Eaton and Kortum (2002) apply a similar principle to determine an aggregate gravity equation across
heterogeneous Ricardian sectors. As in our model, the predicted trade volume reﬂects an extensive margin
(number of sectors/goods traded) and an intensive one (volume of trade per good/sector). However, Eaton and
Kortum do not model ﬁxed trade costs and the possibility of zero bilateral trade ﬂows. Unlike our equations,
theirs are subject to the criticism raised by Haveman and Hummels (2004). Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and
Kortum (2003) use direct information on U.S. plant-level sales, productivity, and export status to calibrate a
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All Trade in both direction
Figure 2: Aggregate volumes of exports, measured in billions of 2000 U.S. dollars, of all
country pairs and of country pairs that traded in both directions in 1970, 1970-1997
2 A Glance at the Data
Figure 1 depicts the empirical extent of zero trade ﬂows. In this ﬁgure, all possible country
pairs are partitioned into three categories: the top portion represents the fraction of country
pairs that do not trade with one-another; the bottom portion represents those that trade in
both directions (they export to one-another); and the middle portion represents those that
trade in one direction only (one country imports from, but does not export to, the other
c o u n t r y ) .A si se v i d e n tf r o mt h eﬁgure, by disregarding countries that do not trade with each
other or trade only in one direction one disregards close to half of the observations. We show
below that these observations contain useful information for estimating international trade
ﬂows.10
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the aggregate real volume of exports of all 161 countries
in our sample, and of the aggregate real volume of exports of the subset of country pairs
that exported to one-another in 1970. The diﬀerence between the two curves represents
the volume of trade of country pairs that either did not trade in 1970 or traded in 1970 in
one direction only. It is clear from this ﬁgure that the rapid growth of trade, at an annual
rate of 7.5% on average, was mostly driven by the growth of trade between countries that
traded with each other in both directions at the beginning of the period. In other words, the
10Silva and Tenreyro (2003) also argue that zero trade ﬂows can be used in the estimation of the gravity
equation, but they emphasize a heteroskedasticity bias that emanates from the log-linearization of the equation
rather than the selection and asymmetry biases that we emphasize. Moreover, the Poisson method that they
propose to use yields similar estimates on the sample of countries that have positive trade ﬂows in both
directions and the sample of countries that have positive and zero trade ﬂows. We shall have more to say
about their paper in Section 5.
5contribution to the growth of trade of countries that started to trade after 1970 in either one
or both directions, was relatively small.
Combining this evidence with the evidence from Figure 1, which shows a relatively slow
growth of the fraction of trading country pairs, suggests that bilateral trading volumes of
country pairs that traded with one-another in both directions at the beginning of the period
must have been much larger than the bilateral trading volumes of country pairs that either
did not trade with each other or traded in one direction only at the beginning of the period.
Indeed, at the end of the period the average bilateral trade volume of country pairs of the
former type was about 35 times larger than the average bilateral trade volume of country pairs
of the latter type. This suggests that the rapid growth of world trade was an intensive margin
phenomenon. That is, the enlargement of the set of trading countries did not contribute in
a major way to the growth of world trade.11
3T h e o r y
Consider a world with J countries, indexed by j =1 ,2,...,J. Every country consumes and






, 0 <α<1 ,
where xj (l) is its consumption of product l and Bj is the set of products available for
consumption in country j. The parameter α determines the elasticity of substitution across
products, which is ε =1 /(1 − α). This elasticity is the same in every country.
Let Yj b et h ei n c o m eo fc o u n t r yj, which equals its expenditure level. Then country j’s















This speciﬁcation implies that every product has a constant demand elasticity ε.
Some of the products consumed in country j are domestically produced while others are
imported. Country j has a measure Nj of ﬁrms, each one producing a distinct product.
The products produced by country-j ﬁrms are also distinct from the products produced by
11This contrasts with the sector-level evidence presented by Evenett and Venables (2002). They ﬁnd a
substantial increase in the number of trading partners at the 3-digit sector level for a selected group of 23
developing countries. We conjecture that their country sample is not representative and that most of their
new trading pairs were originally trading in other sectors.
6country-i ﬁrms for i 6= j. As a result, there are
PJ
j=1 Nj products in the world economy.
Ac o u n t r y - j ﬁrm produces one unit of output with a cost-minimizing combination of
inputs that cost cja,w h e r ea measures the number of bundles of the country’s inputs used
by the ﬁrm per unit output and cj measures the cost of this bundle. The cost cj is country
speciﬁc, reﬂecting diﬀerences across countries in factor prices, whereas a is ﬁrm-speciﬁc,
reﬂecting productivity diﬀerences across ﬁrms in the same country. The inverse of a, 1/a,
represents the ﬁrm’s productivity level.12 We assume that a cumulative distribution function
G(a) with support [aL,a H] describes the distribution of a across ﬁrms, where aH >a L ≥ 0.
This distribution function is the same in all countries.13
We assume that a producer bears only production costs when selling in the home market.
T h a ti s ,i fac o u n t r y - j producer with coeﬃcient a sells in country j, the delivery cost of its
product is cja. If, however, this same producer seeks to sell its product in country i,t h e r ea r e
two additional costs it has to bear: a ﬁxed cost of serving country i, which equals cjfij,a n d
a transport cost. As is customary, we adopt the ‘melting iceberg’ speciﬁcation and assume
that τij units of a product have to be shipped from country j to i in order for one unit to
arrive. We assume that fjj =0for every j and fij > 0 for i 6= j,a n dτjj =1for every j and
τij > 1 for i 6= j. Note that the ﬁxed cost coeﬃcients fij and the transport cost coeﬃcients
τij depend on the identity of the importing and exporting countries, but not on the identity
of the exporting producer. In particular, they do not depend on the producer’s productivity
level.
There is monopolistic competition in ﬁnal products. Since every producer of a distinct
product is of measure zero, the demand function (1) implies that a country-j producer with




cja .( 3 )
This is a standard markup pricing equation, with the markup being smaller the larger the
demand elasticity of demand. It follows that if the country-j producer of product l has the
input coeﬃcient a and it sells its product in the home market, the home market consumer
pays ˆ pj (l)=cja/α. If, however, it sells the product in a foreign country i, the consumers in
i are charged ˆ pi (l)=τijcja/α. As a result, the producer’s operating proﬁts from selling in
country i are





Yi − cjfij .
Evidently, these operating proﬁts are positive for sales in the domestic market, because
fjj =0 . Therefore all Nj producers sell in country j.B u t s a l e s i n c o u n t r y i 6= j are
12See Melitz (2003) for a discussion of a general equilibrium model of trading countries in which ﬁrms are
heterogeneous in productivity. We follow his speciﬁcation.
13The as only capture relative productivity diﬀerences across ﬁrms in a country. Aggregate productivity
diﬀerences across countries are subsumed in the cjs.






Yi = cjfij . (4)
It follows that only a fraction G(aij) of country j’s Nj ﬁrms export to country i.F o r t h i s
reason the set Bi of products that are available in country i is smaller than the set of products
available in the world economy. In particular, no ﬁrm from country j exports to country i if
aij is smaller than aL, i.e., if the least productive ﬁrm that can proﬁtably export to country
i has a coeﬃcient a that is below the support of G(a).A n da l lﬁrms from country j export
to country i if aij is larger than aH.
We next characterize bilateral trade volumes. Let
Vij =
( R aij
aL a1−εdG(a) for aij ≥ aL
0 otherwise
.( 5 )
Then the demand function (1) and the pricing equation (3) imply that the value of country






YiNjVij .( 6 )
This bilateral trade volume equals zero when aij ≤ aL, because under these circumstances









Equations (4)-(7) provide a mapping from the income levels Yi,t h en u m b e r so fﬁrms Ni,t h e
unit costs ci,t h eﬁxed costs fij, and the transport costs τij, to the bilateral trade ﬂows Mij.
We show in Appendix B that, together with equality of income and expenditure, equa-
tions (4)-(7) can be used to derive a generalization of Anderson and van Wincoop’s (2003)
gravity equation that embodies third-country eﬀects. Their equation applies when trans-
port costs are symmetric, i.e., τij = τji for all country pairs, and the variables Vij can be
multiplicatively decomposed into three components: one that depends only on importer char-
acteristics, a second that depends only on exporter characteristics, and a third that depends
on the country pair characteristics but is symmetric across country pairs, so that it is the
same for i,j as for j,i. This decomposability holds in Anderson and van Wincoop’s model.
Importantly, however, there are other cases of interest, less restrictive than the Anderson
and van Wincoop speciﬁcation, that satisfy them too. Therefore, our equation applies under
14Note that aij → +∞ as fij → 0.
8wider circumstances, and in particular, when there is productivity heterogeneity across ﬁrms
and ﬁrms bear ﬁxed costs of exporting. Under these circumstances only a fraction of the
ﬁrms export; those with the highest productivity. Finally, note that our formulation is more
relevant for empirical analysis, because, unlike previous formulations, it enables bilateral
trade ﬂows to equal zero. This ﬂexibility is important because, as we have explained in the
introduction, there are many zero bilateral trade ﬂows in the data.
In order to gain as much ﬂexibility as possible in the empirical application, we develop
in the next section an estimation procedure that builds directly on equations (4)-(7), which
allow for asymmetric bilateral trade ﬂows, including zeros.
4 Empirical Framework
We maintain the assumption of a Pareto distribution for productivity, 1/a, but now assume







aH >a L > 0. In addition, we allow aij <a L for some i,j pairs. When this happens, no ﬁrm
from country j is productive enough to export to country i, inducing zero exports from j to
i, i.e., Vij =0and Mij =0 .H o w e v e r ,ﬁrms from country j may export to other destinations
and country i may import from other sources. In other words, this framework allows for
asymmetric trade ﬂows, Mij 6= Mji, which may also be unidirectional, with Mji > 0 and
Mij =0 ,o rMji =0and Mij > 0. Such unidirectional trading relationships are empirically
common and can be predicted using our empirical method. Moreover, asymmetric trade
frictions are not necessary to induce such asymmetric trade ﬂows when productivity is drawn
from a truncated Pareto distribution.



















and aij is determined by the zero proﬁt condition (4). Note that both Vij and Wij are
monotonic functions of the proportion of exporters from j to i, G(aij).T h ee x p o r tv o l u m e
from j to i, given by (6), can now be expressed in log-linear form as
mij =( ε − 1)lnα − (ε − 1)lncj + nj +( ε − 1)pi + yi +( 1− ε)lnτij + vij,
where lowercase variables represent the natural logarithms of their respective uppercase vari-
ables. τij captures variable trade costs; costs that aﬀect the volume of ﬁrm-level exports. We
assume that these costs are stochastic due to i.i.d. unmeasured trade frictions uij,w h i c ha r e
9country-pair speciﬁc. In particular, let τε−1
ij ≡ D
γ
ije−uij,w h e r eDij represents the (symmet-
ric) distance between i and j,a n duij ∼ N(0,σ2
u).15 Then the equation of the bilateral trade
ﬂows mij yields the following estimating equation:
mij = β0 + λj + χi − γdij + wij + uij, (9)
where χi =( ε − 1)pi+yi is a ﬁxed eﬀect of the importing country and λj = −(ε − 1)lncj+nj
is a ﬁxed eﬀect of the exporting country.16
The estimating equation (9) highlights several important diﬀerences with the gravity
equation, as derived, for example, by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). The most important
diﬀerence is the addition in our formulation of the new variable wij, that controls for the
fraction of ﬁr m s( p o s s i b l yz e r o )t h a te x p o r tf r o mj to i. This variable is a function of the
cutoﬀ aij, which is determined by other explanatory variables (see (4)). When wij is not
included on the right-hand-side, the coeﬃcient γ on distance (or any other coeﬃcient on a
potential trade barrier) can no longer be interpreted as the elasticity of a ﬁrm’s trade with
respect to distance (or other trade barriers), which is the way in which such trade barriers
are almost always modeled in the literature that follows the “new” trade theory. Instead, the
estimation of the standard gravity equation confounds the eﬀects of trade barriers on ﬁrm-
level trade with their eﬀects on the proportion of exporting ﬁrms, which induces an upward
bias in the estimated coeﬃcient γ.
Another bias is introduced in the estimation of equation (9) when country pairs with
zero trade ﬂows are excluded. This selection eﬀect induces a positive correlation between the
unobserved uijs and the trade barrier dijs; country pairs with large observed trade barriers
(high dij) that trade with each other are likely to have low unobserved trade barriers (high
uij). Although this induces a downward bias in the trade barrier coeﬃcient, our empirical
results show that this eﬀect is dominated by the upward bias generated by the endogenous
number of exporters.
Lastly, we emphasize again that in our formulation bilateral trade ﬂows need not be
balanced, even when all bilateral trade barriers are symmetric. First, the variables wij can
be asymmetric. Second, the ﬁxed eﬀects of importers may diﬀer from the ﬁxed eﬀects of
exporters. This substantiates the use of export ﬂows and separate ﬁxed eﬀects as an exporter
and as an importer, for every country.
15In the following derivations, we use distance as the only source of observable variable trade costs. It should
nevertheless be clear how this approach generalizes to a vector of observable bilateral trade frictions paired
with a vector of elasticities γ.
16We replace vij with wij, and therefore β0 now also contains the log of the constant multiplier in Vij.
If tariﬀs are not directly controlled for, then the importer’s ﬁxed eﬀect will subsume an average tariﬀ level.
Similarly, average export taxes will show up in the exporter’s ﬁxed eﬀect.
10Firm Selection Into Export Markets
The selection of ﬁrms into export markets, represented by the variable Wij, is determined by
the cutoﬀ value of aij, which is implicitly deﬁn e db yt h ez e r op r o ﬁt condition (4). We deﬁne












This is the ratio of variable export proﬁts for the most productive ﬁrm (with productivity
1/aL)t ot h eﬁxed export costs (common to all exporters) for exports from j to i. Positive
exports are observed if and only if Zij > 1. In this case Wij is a monotonic function of Zij,i . e . ,
Wij = Z
(k−ε+1)/(ε−1)
ij − 1 (see (4) and (8)). As with the variable trade costs τij, we assume
that the ﬁxed export costs fij are stochastic due to unmeasured trade frictions νij that
are i.i.d., but may be correlated with the uijs. Let fij ≡ exp
¡
φEX,j + φIM,i + κφij − νij
¢
,
where νij ∼ N(0,σ2
ν), φIM,i is a ﬁxed trade barrier imposed by the importing country on all
exporters, φEX,j is a measure of ﬁxed export costs common across all export destinations, and
φij is an observed measure of any additional country-pair speciﬁc ﬁxed trade costs.17 Using
this speciﬁcation together with (ε − 1)lnτij ≡ γdij −uij, the latent variable zij ≡ lnZij can
be expressed as
zij = γ0 + ξj + ζi − γdij − κφij + ηij, (10)
where ηij ≡ uij + νij ∼ N(0,σ2
u + σ2
ν) is i.i.d. (yet correlated with the error term uij in the
gravity equation), ξj = −εlncj + φEX,j are ﬁxed eﬀects of exporters, and ζi =( ε − 1)pi +
yi −φIM,i are ﬁxed-eﬀects of importers. Although zij is unobserved, we observe the presence
of trade ﬂows. Therefore zij > 0 when j exports to i and zij =0when it does not. Moreover,
the value of zij aﬀects the export volume.
Deﬁne the indicator variable Tij to equal 1 when country j exports to i and 0 when it
does not. Let ρij be the probability that j exports to i, conditional on the observed variables.
Since we do not want to impose σ2
η ≡ σ2
u + σ2
ν =1 , we divide (10) by the standard deviation
ση, and specify the following Probit equation:





i − γ∗dij − κ∗φij
¢
, (11)
where Φ(·) is the cdf of the unit-normal distribution, and every starred coeﬃcient represents
the original coeﬃcient divided by ση.18 Importantly, this selection equation has been derived
17As with variable trade costs, it should be clear how this derivation can be extended to a vector of observable
ﬁxed trade costs.
18By construction, the error term η
∗
ij ≡ ηij/ση is distributed unit-normal. The Probit equation (11)
distinguishes between observable trade barriers that aﬀect variable trade costs (dij) and ﬁxed trade costs
(fij). In practice, some variables may aﬀect both. Their coeﬃcients in (11) then capture the combined eﬀect
of these barriers.
11from a ﬁrm-level decision, and it therefore does not contain the unobserved and endogenous
variable Wij that is related to the fraction of exporting ﬁrms. Moreover, the Probit equation
can be used to derive consistent estimates of Wij.
Let ˆ ρij be the predicted probability of exports from j to i, using the estimates from the
Probit equation (11), and let ˆ z∗
ij = Φ−1 ¡
ˆ ρij
¢
be the estimated latent variable z∗
ij ≡ zij/ση.
Then, a consistent estimate for Wij can be obtained from







where δ ≡ ση (k − ε +1 )/(ε − 1).
Consistent Estimation of the Log-Linear Equation
Consistent estimation of (9) requires controls for both the endogenous number of exporters
(via wij) and the selection of country pairs into trading partners (which generates a corre-
lation between the unobserved uij and the independent variables). We thus need estimates
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ij.S i n c eη∗
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is a consistent estimate for E [wij | .,Tij =1 ](see (12)). We therefore can estimate (9) using
the transformation












+ βuηˆ ¯ η∗
ij + eij, (13)




ση and eij is an i.i.d. normally distributed error term satisfying
E [eij | .,Tij =1 ]=0 . Since (13) is non-linear in δ,w ee s t i m a t ei tu s i n gm a x i m u ml i k e l i h o o d
(maintaining the normality assumption for eij).
The use of ˆ ¯ η∗
ij to control for E [uij | .,Tij =1 ]is the standard Heckman (1979) correction
for sample selection. This addresses the biases generated by the unobserved country-pair
level shocks uij and ηij, but this does not correct for the biases generated by the underlying
unobserved ﬁrm-level heterogeneity. The latter biases are corrected by the additional control
ˆ z∗
ij (along with the functional form determined by our theoretical assumptions). Used alone,
the standard Heckman (1979) correction would only be valid in a world without ﬁrm-level
heterogeneity, or where such heterogeneity is not correlated with the export decision. Then,
all ﬁrms are identically aﬀected by trade barriers and country characteristics, and make
the same export decisions – or make export decisions that are uncorrelated with trade
barriers and country characteristics. This misses the potentially important eﬀect of trade
barriers and country characteristics on the share of exporting ﬁrms. In a world with ﬁrm-
level heterogeneity, a larger fraction of ﬁrms export to more “attractive” export destinations.
12Our empirical results highlight the overwhelming contribution of this channel relative to the
standard correction for sample selection, which ignores ﬁrm-level heterogeneity.
5 Traditional Estimates
Traditional estimates of the gravity equation use data on country pairs that trade in at least
one direction. The ﬁrst column in Table 1 provides a representative estimate of this sort,
for 1986. Note that instead of constructing symmetric trade ﬂows by combining exports
and imports for each country pair, we use the unidirectional trade value and introduce both
importing and exporting country ﬁxed eﬀect. With these ﬁxed eﬀects every country pair can
be represented twice: one time for exports from i to j and another time for exports from j
to i. Nevertheless, the results in Table 1 are similar to those obtained with symmetric trade
ﬂows and a unique country ﬁxed eﬀect. They show that country j exports more to country i
when the two countries are closer to each other, they both belong to the same regional free
trade agreement (FTA), they share a common language, they have a common land border,
they are not islands, they share the same legal system, they share the same currency, and if
one country has colonized the other. The probability that two randomly drawn persons, one
from each country, share the same religion does not aﬀect export volumes. Details on the
construction of the variables are provided in the appendix.
Among the 158 countries with available data, there are 24,806 possible bilateral export
relationships. However, only 11,146 of these relationships have non-zero exports. We then es-
timate a Probit equation for the presence of a trading relationship using the same explanatory
v a r i a b l e sa st h ei n i t i a lg r a v i t ys p e c i ﬁcation (the speciﬁcation follows (11), with exporter and
importer ﬁxed eﬀects). The results are reported in column 2, along with the marginal eﬀects
evaluated at the sample means. These results clearly show that the very same variables that
impact export volumes from j to i also impact the probability that j exports to i.I na l m o s t
all cases, the impact goes in the same direction. The eﬀect of a common border is the only
exception: it raises the volume of trade but reduces the probability of trading. We attribute
this ﬁnding to the eﬀect of territorial border conﬂicts that suppress trade between neighbors.
In the absence of such conﬂicts, common land borders enhan c et r a d e .W ea l s on o t et h a ta
common religion strongly aﬀects the formation of trading relationships (its eﬀect is almost as
large as that for a common language), yet its eﬀect on trade volumes is negligible. Overall,
this evidence strongly suggests that disregarding the selection equation of trading partners
biases the estimates of the export equation, as we have argued in Section 4.
These results, and their consequences, are not speciﬁc to 1986. We repeat the same re-
gressions increasing the sample years to cover all of the 1980s, adding year ﬁxed eﬀects. The
results in columns 3 and 4 are very similar to those in the ﬁrst two columns. As expected,
the standard errors are reduced (all standard errors are robust to clustering by country
pairs). Adding the time variation also allows the identiﬁcation of the eﬀects of changing
13country characteristics. We use this additional source of variation to investigate the eﬀects
of WTO/GATT membership (hereafter summarized as WTO) on trade volumes as well as
the formation of bilateral trade relationships. We thus repeat the same regressions for the
1980s, adding bilateral controls whenever both countries or neither country is a member of
WTO. As emphasized by Subramanian and Wei (2003), the use of unidirectional trade data
and separate exporter and importer ﬁxed eﬀects substantially increases the statistically sig-
niﬁcant positive eﬀect of WTO membership on trade volumes.19 Our theoretical framework
provides the justiﬁcation for this estimation strategy when bilateral trade ﬂows are asym-
metric. Furthermore, we also ﬁnd that WTO membership has a very strong and signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the formation of bilateral trading relationships. The coeﬃcients in column 6 show
that, for any country pair, joint WTO membership has a similar impact on the probability
of trade as a common language or colonial ties.
6 Two-Stage Estimation
Now turn to the second-stage estimation of the trade ﬂow equation, as proposed in Section 4.
We have already run the ﬁrst-stage Probit selection equation (11), which yields the predicted
probability of export ˆ ρij (see Table 1). We use the estimates of this equation to construct
ˆ ¯ η∗
ij = φ(ˆ z∗
ij)/Φ(ˆ z∗













.20 The former controls for the
sample selection bias while the latter controls for unobserved ﬁrm heterogeneity, i.e., the eﬀect
of trade frictions and country characteristics on the proportion of exporters. Our theoretical
model suggests that potential trade barriers that only represent ﬁxed trade costs should only
be used as explanatory variables in the selection equation. Econometrically, this provides the
needed exclusion restriction for identiﬁcation of the second stage gravity equation for trade
volumes. On both theoretical and empirical grounds (see the results in Table 1), we omit the
common religion indicator from the second stage estimation.21
The results from the selection equation are reproduced in the initial columns of Table
2 for both 1986 and the 1980s. We also re-run the standard “benchmark” gravity equation
omitting the religion control and report the results in the next columns (they are almost
identical to those in Table 1). The following columns implement the second stage estimation
by incorporating the controls for ˆ ¯ w∗
ij and ˆ ¯ η∗
ij. Both the non-linear coeﬃcient δ for ˆ ¯ w∗
ij and
the linear coeﬃcient for ˆ ¯ η∗
ij are precisely estimated. The remaining results for the linear
coeﬃcients clearly demonstrate the importance of unmeasured heterogeneity bias when esti-
mating the eﬀect of trade barriers: higher trade volumes are not just the direct consequence
of lower trade barriers; they also represent a greater proportion of exporters to a particular
19Rose (2004) reports a signiﬁcant though smaller eﬀect of WTO membership on trade volumes using
symmetric trade ﬂow data and a unique set of country ﬁxed eﬀects.







21Another source of identiﬁcation comes from the opposite eﬀect of a common border in the selection and
trade volume equations.
14destination. Consequently, the measures of the eﬀects of trade frictions in the benchmark
gravity equation are biased upwards as they confound the true eﬀect of these frictions with
their indirect eﬀect on the proportion of exporting ﬁrms.22 As highlighted in Table 2, these
biases are substantial. The coeﬃcient on distance drops roughly by a third, indicating a
much smaller eﬀect of distance on ﬁrm level (hence product level) trade.23 The eﬀects of a
currency union and colonial ties on ﬁrm or product level trade are also reduced by a similar
proportion. The biases for the eﬀects of FTAs and WTO membership are even more severe as
their coeﬃcients drop roughly in half, though they both remain economically and statistically
signiﬁcant. The measured eﬀect of a common language is even more aﬀected as it becomes
insigniﬁcant (and precisely estimated around zero). This suggests that a common language
predominantly reduces the ﬁxed costs of trade: it has a great inﬂuence on a ﬁrm’s choice of
export location, but not on its export volume, once that decision is made.
Decomposing the Biases
Our second stage estimation addresses two diﬀerent sources of bias for standard gravity
equations: a selection bias that arises from the pairing of countries into exporter-importer
relationships, and an unobserved heterogeneity bias that results from the variation in the
fraction of ﬁrms that export from a source to a destination country. To examine the relative
importance of these biases, we now estimate two speciﬁcations of the second-stage export
equation, one controlling for unobserved heterogeneity only, the other controlling for selection
only.
The results for 1986 are reported in Table 3. The ﬁrst two columns report the standard
gravity “benchmark” equation and our second stage estimation from Table 2. The diﬀerences
in the estimated coeﬃcients of these two equations represent the joint outcome of the two
biases. As we discussed, all the coeﬃcients, with the exception of the land border eﬀect, are
lower in absolute value in the second column. We then implement a simple linear correction
for unobserved heterogeneity by adding ˆ z∗
ij = Φ−1(ˆ ρij) as an additional regressor to the
standard gravity speciﬁcation (here, we do not correct for the sample selection bias via ˆ ¯ η∗
ij).
The results reported in the third column clearly show that this unobserved heterogeneity
(the proportion of exporting ﬁrms) addresses almost all the biases in the standard gravity
equation. The coeﬃcients and standard errors for all the observed trade barriers are very
similar to those obtained in our second stage non-linear estimation.
In the fourth column, we correct only for the selection bias (the standard two-stage Heck-
man selection procedure) by introducing the Mills ratio ˆ ¯ η∗
ij as an additional regressor to the
benchmark speciﬁcation. Although the estimated coeﬃcient on ˆ ¯ η∗
ij is positive and signiﬁcant,
22The eﬀect of a land border is an exception here since it negatively aﬀects the probability of trade.
23Several studies have documented that the eﬀect of distance in gravity models is overstated since distance
is correlated with other trade frictions (such as lack of information). The same issue applies here, and would
even further reduce the directly measured eﬀect of distance.
15the remaining coeﬃcients are very similar to those obtained in the benchmark speciﬁcation
of column 1. Thus, the bias corrections implemented in our second stage estimation are dom-
inated by the inﬂuence of unobserved ﬁrm heterogeneity rather than sample selection. This
ﬁnding suggests that while aggregate country-pair shocks do have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on trade
patterns, they only negligibly aﬀect the responsiveness of trade volumes to observed trade
barriers.24 The results in column 3 clearly show that this is not the case for the eﬀects of
unobserved heterogeneity: the latter would aﬀect trade volumes even were all country pairs
trading with one-another, since it operates independently of the selection eﬀect. Neglect-
ing to control for this unobserved heterogeneity induces most of the biases exhibited in the
standard gravity speciﬁcation.
Evidence on Asymmetric Trade Relationships
As was previously mentioned, our model predicts asymmetric trade ﬂows between countries.
These asymmetries can be extreme, with trade predicted in only one direction, as also reﬂected
in the data. More nuanced, trade can be positive in both directions, but with a net trade
imbalance. Figure 3 graphically represents the extent of the predicted trade asymmetries
by plotting the predicted probability of export between country pairs (ˆ ρij versus ˆ ρji). The
predicted asymmetries are clearly large, as measured by the distance from the diagonal for
a substantial proportion of country pairs. Do these predicted asymmetries have explanatory
power for the direction of trade ﬂows and net bilateral trade balances? The answer is an
overwhelming yes, as evidenced by the results reported in Table 4. The ﬁrst part of the
table shows the results of the OLS regression of Tij − Tji on ˆ ρij − ˆ ρji (based on the Probit
results for 1986). Note that the regressand, Tij −Tji, takes on the values −1, 0, 1, depending
on the direction of trade between i and j (it is 0 if trade ﬂo w si nb o t hd i r e c t i o n so ri ft h e
countries do not trade at all). The magnitude of the regressor ˆ ρij −ˆ ρji measures the model’s
prediction for an asymmetric trading relationship, while its sign predicts the direction of
the asymmetry. Table 4 shows that the predicted asymmetries have a substantial amount
of explanatory power; the regressor coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at any conventional level and
explains on its own 23% of the variation in the direction of trade.25 We emphasize that the
regressor is constructed only from the predicted probability of export ˆ ρij, which is a function
only of country level variables (the ﬁxed eﬀects) and symmetric bilateral measures.
The second part of Table 4 shows the results of the OLS regression of net bilateral trade
mij − mji (the percentage diﬀerence between exports and imports) on ˆ ¯ w∗
ij − ˆ ¯ w∗
ji (only for
those country pairs trading in both directions). This regressor captures diﬀerences in the pro-
24This ﬁnding also highlights the important information conveyed by the non-trading country pairs. If such
zero trade values were just the outcome of censoring, then a Tobit speciﬁcation would provide the best ﬁtt o
the data. This is just a more restrictive version of the selection model, which is rejected by the data in favor
of the speciﬁcation incorporating ﬁrm heterogeneity.
25This understates the variable’s explanatory power as it is continuous and predicting a discrete variable.
16portion of exporting ﬁrms. Combined with the country ﬁxed eﬀects, these variables capture
diﬀerences in the number of exporting ﬁrms from one country to the other. Again, we ﬁnd
that this single regressor is a strong predictor of net bilateral trade. On its own, it explains
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Figure 3: Predicted Asymmetries: min(ˆ ρij,ˆ ρji) versus max(ˆ ρij,ˆ ρji)
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We describe in this appendix our data sources.
Trade data
The bilateral trade ﬂows are from Feenstra’s “World Trade Flows, 1970-1992” and “World
Trade Flows, 1980-1997”. These data include 183 “country titles” over the period 1970 to
1997. In some cases Feenstra grouped several countries into a single title. We excluded 12
such titles, which we found diﬃcult to identify with a particular country. This left usable
data for bilateral trade ﬂows among 161 countries. The list of these countries is provided at
the end of this appendix.
For these 161 countries, we constructed a matrix of trade ﬂows, measured in U.S. dollars.
This matrix represents 161 × 160 = 25,760 trade ﬂows, consisting of exports from country j
to country i.M a n yo ft h e s ee x p o r tﬂows are zeros.
Country-level data
Population and real GDP per capita have been obtained from three standard sources: the
Penn World Tables 6.1, the World Bank, and the IMF. [specify variables and sources]
We used the CIA’s World Factbook to construct a number of variables, which can be
classiﬁed as follows:26
1. Geography Latitude, longitude, and whether a country is landlocked or an island.
2. Institutions Legal origin, colonial origin, GATT/WTO membership.
3. Culture Primary language and religion. The later is represented by a vector, consisting
of the fractions of people belonging to various religions, such as Catholic, Muslim,
Protestant, and other.
We also used data from Rose (2000) to identify whether a country belongs to a currency
union.
Using these data, we constructed country-pair speciﬁc variables, such as the distance
between countries i and j, whether they share a border, the same legal system, the same
colonial origin, or membership in the GATT/WTO.
26See http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/docs/proﬁleguide.html.
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W ed e r i v ei nt h i sa p p e n d i xag r a v i t ye q u a t i o nw i t ht h i r d - c o u n t r ye ﬀects, which general-
izes Anderson and van Wincoop’s (2003) equation, and we show that their equation applies
whenever τij = τji f o re v e r yc o u n t r yp a i ra n dVij can be decomposed in a particular way.
We then discuss some limitations of their formulation.
Equality of income and expenditure implies Yi =
PJ
j=1 Mji. That is, country i’s exports
to all countries, including sales to home residents Mii,e q u a l st h ev a l u eo fc o u n t r yi’s output.
































j=1 Yj is world income and sh = Yh/Y is the share of country h in world income.
We next show that if Vij is decomposable in a particular way, and transport costs are
symmetric (i.e., τij = τji for all i and j), then (B2) yields the generalized gravity equation
that has been derived by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). Their speciﬁcation satisﬁes
these conditions. Importantly, however, there are other cases of interest, less restrictive
than the Anderson and van Wincoop speciﬁcation, that satisfy them too. Therefore, our
derivation of the gravity equation shows that it applies under wider circumstances, and in
particular, when there is productivity heterogeneity across ﬁrms and ﬁrms bear ﬁxed costs
of exporting. Under these circumstances only a fraction of the ﬁrms export; those with the
highest productivity. Finally, note that our general formulation – without decomposability
– is more relevant for empirical analysis, because, unlike previous formulations, it enables
bilateral trade ﬂows to equal zero. This ﬂexibility is important because, as we have explained
in the introduction, there are many zero bilateral trade ﬂows in the data.
Consider the following





where ϕIM,i depends only on the parameters of the importing country, ϕEX,j depends
only on the parameters of the exporting country, and ϕij = ϕji for all i,j.
19In this decomposition, only the symmetric terms ϕij depend on the joint identity of the
importing and exporting countries, whereas all other parameters do not.
To illustrate circumstances in which the decomposability assumption is satisﬁed, ﬁrst
consider a situation where the ﬁxed costs fij are very small, so that aij >a H for all i,j.
That is, the lowest productivity level that makes exporting proﬁtable, 1/aij, is lower than
the lowest productivity level in the support of G(·), 1/aH. Under these circumstances all
ﬁrms export and Vij is the same for every country pair i,j.27 Alternatively, suppose that
productivity 1/a has a Pareto distribution with shape k and aL =0 .T h a ti s ,G(a)=( a/aH)
k
for 0 ≤ a ≤ aH.M o r e o v e r ,l e te i t h e rfij depend only on the identity of the exporter, so that
fij = fj,o rl e tt h eﬁxed costs be symmetric, so that fij = fji.T h e n Vij satisﬁes the
decomposability assumption and in every country j only a fraction of ﬁrms export to country
i.28




















This is essentially the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) system. Evidently, the solution of




28Under these conditions Vij = k(aij)
k−ε+1 /(aH)
k (k − ε +1 ) and either aij =
[cjfj/(1 − α)]
1/(1−ε) /(τijcj/αPi),s ot h a tfj becomes part of vEX,j whereas τij becomes part of φij,
or aij =[ cjfij/(1 − α)]
1/(1−ε) /(τijcj/αPi),s ot h a tfij and τij become part of φij.






















































Equations (F2) and (F3) together with symmetry conditions τij = τji and ϕij = ϕji then imply that Qj = ˆ Qj
for every j. As a result (F1) and (F2) yield the equations in the text.
20the Qjs depends only on income shares and transport costs, and possibly on a constant in Vij
that is embodied in the ϕijs. However, an upward shift of this constant raises proportionately
the product QiQj, and therefore has no eﬀect on Mij. Therefore, imports of country i from j
as a share of world income, which equal imports of country j from i as a share of world income,
depend only on the structure of trade costs and the size distribution of countries. Bilateral
imports as a fraction of world income are proportional to the product of the two countries’
shares in world income, with the factor of proportionality depending on the structure of
trading costs and the worldwide distribution of relative country size.
The decomposability assumption is too restrictive, however. It implies that if imports of
country i from j equal zero, i.e., Vij =0 ,t h e ne i t h e rϕIM,i is inﬁnite or ϕEX,j is inﬁnite,
because ε>1. In the former case imports of country i equal zero from all countries, while in
the latter case exports of country j equal zero to all countries. In other words, some countries
do not import at all while other countries do not export at all; but it is not possible for a
country to import from some other countries but not from all of them or for a county to
export to some other countries but not to all of them. These restrictions are not consistent
with the data. As we have explained in the introduction, most countries trade only with a
fraction of the countries in the world economy; neither with all of them nor with none of
them. To explain these patterns, we need a ﬂexible model that allows for zero bilateral trade
ﬂows. Such a model should help in explaining which countries trade with each other and the
resulting volumes of bilateral trade ﬂows. Indeed, the logic of our theoretical model suggests
that the decision to export to a foreign country is not independent of the volume of exports.
For this reason the decision to export should be analyzed in conjunction with the decision on
the export volume. Moreover, unlike (B3) and (B4), a suitable model should allow country
j’s exports to i to diﬀer from country i’s exports to j. Unlike standard estimation procedures
of the gravity equations, a model of this sort will enable estimation that takes advantage of
all the observations in the data, not only observations of country pairs that have positive
two-way bilateral trade ﬂows. For these reasons we use the less restrictive equations (4)-(7)
for estimation purposes.
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m_ij m_ij m_ij
Variables Coeff. dF/dX Coeff. dF/dX Coeff. dF/dX
Distance -1.176 -0.660 -0.263 -1.201 -0.618 -0.246 -1.200 -0.618 -0.246
(0.031)** (0.029)** (0.012)** (0.024)** (0.021)** (0.008)** (0.024)** (0.021)** (0.008)**
Land border 0.458 -0.382 -0.148 0.366 -0.380 -0.146 0.364 -0.380 -0.146
(0.147)** (0.129)* (0.047)* (0.131)** (0.089)** (0.032)** (0.131)** (0.089)** (0.032)**
Island -0.391 -0.345 -0.136 -0.381 -0.355 -0.140 -0.378 -0.355 -0.140
(0.121)** (0.082)** (0.032)** (0.096)** (0.056)** (0.022)** (0.096)** (0.056)** (0.022)**
Landlock -0.561 -0.181 -0.072 -0.582 -0.220 -0.087 -0.581 -0.221 -0.087
(0.188)** (0.114) (0.045) (0.148)** (0.071)** (0.028)** (0.147)** (0.071)** (0.028)**
Legal 0.486 0.096 0.038 0.406 0.072 0.029 0.407 0.071 0.028
(0.050)** (0.034)* (0.014)* (0.040)** (0.022)** (0.009)** (0.040)** (0.022)** (0.009)**
Language 0.176 0.284 0.113 0.207 0.275 0.109 0.203 0.273 0.108
(0.061)** (0.042)** (0.016)** (0.047)** (0.027)** (0.011)** (0.047)** (0.027)** (0.011)**
Religion 0.102 0.261 0.104 -0.018 0.249 0.099 -0.038 0.245 0.098
(0.096) (0.063)** (0.025)** (0.076) (0.040)** (0.016)** (0.077) (0.040)** (0.016)**
Colonial Ties 1.299 0.325 0.128 1.321 0.288 0.114 1.326 0.293 0.116
(0.120)** (0.305) (0.117) (0.110)** (0.209) (0.082) (0.110)** (0.211) (0.082)
Currency Union 1.364 0.492 0.190 1.395 0.530 0.206 1.409 0.531 0.206
(0.255)** (0.143)** (0.052)** (0.187)** (0.071)** (0.026)** (0.187)** (0.071)** (0.026)**
FTA 0.759 1.985 0.494 0.996 1.854 0.497 0.976 1.842 0.495
(0.222)** (0.315)** (0.020)** (0.213)** (0.207)** (0.018)** (0.214)** (0.207)** (0.018)**
WTO (none) -0.068 -0.143 -0.056
(0.058) (0.033)** (0.013)**
WTO (both) 0.303 0.234 0.093
(0.042)** (0.032)** (0.013)**
Observations 11,146 24,649 24,649 110,697 248,060 248,060 110,697 248,060 248,060
R-Squared 0.709 0.587 0.587 0.682 0.551 0.551 0.682 0.551 0.551
Notes:
Exporter, Importer, and year fixed effects
Robust standard errors (clustering by country pair)
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
1986 1980s




Variables (Probit) Benchmark ML (Probit) Benchmark ML
Distance -0.660 -1.181 -0.801 -0.618 -1.198 -0.822
(0.029)** (0.031)** (0.030)** (0.021)** (0.024)** (0.024)**
Land border -0.382 0.468 0.831 -0.380 0.360 0.702
(0.129)* (0.146)** (0.139)** (0.089)** (0.131)** (0.123)**
Island -0.345 -0.387 -0.171 -0.355 -0.379 -0.143
(0.082)** (0.120)** (0.117) (0.056)** (0.096)** (0.094)
Landlock -0.181 -0.556 -0.448 -0.221 -0.582 -0.440
(0.114) (0.188)** (0.187)* (0.071)** (0.147)** (0.147)**
Legal 0.096 0.490 0.388 0.071 0.406 0.327
(0.034)* (0.050)** (0.049)** (0.022)** (0.040)** (0.039)**
Language 0.284 0.187 0.024 0.273 0.198 0.033
(0.042)** (0.061)* (0.06) (0.027)** (0.047)** (0.046)
Religion 0.261 -- -- 0.245 -- --
(0.063)** (0.040)**
Colonial Ties 0.325 1.299 1.003 0.293 1.326 1.061
(0.305) (0.121)** (0.114)** (0.211) (0.110)** (0.106)**
Currency Union 0.492 1.356 1.026 0.531 1.412 1.034
(0.143)** (0.256)** (0.258)** (0.071)** (0.187)** (0.191)**
FTA 1.985 0.756 0.386 1.842 0.978 0.519
(0.315)** (0.222)** (0.171)* (0.207)** (0.214)** (0.148)**
WTO (none) -- -- -- -0.143 -0.070 0.001
(0.033)** (0.058) (0.058)
WTO (both) -- -- -- 0.234 0.302 0.143
(0.032)** (0.042)** (0.042)**
delta (from w_hat) -- -- 0.716 -- -- 0.794
(0.060)** (0.067)**
eta_hat -- -- 0.399 -- -- 0.270
(0.063)** (0.049)**
Observations 24,649 11,146 11,146 248,060 110,697 110,697
R-Squared 0.587 0.709 -- 0.551 0.682 --
Notes:
Exporter, Importer, and year fixed effects
Robust standard errors (clustering by country pair)







Variables Benchmark ML Heterogeneity Selection
Distance -1.181 -0.801 -0.824 -1.214
(0.031)** (0.030)** (0.036)** (0.031)**
Land border 0.468 0.831 0.807 0.436
(0.146)** (0.139)** (0.139)** (0.149)**
Island -0.387 -0.171 -0.148 -0.425
(0.120)** (0.117) (0.119) (0.120)**
Landlock -0.556 -0.448 -0.450 -0.565
(0.188)** (0.187)* (0.190)* (0.187)**
Legal 0.490 0.388 0.420 0.488
(0.050)** (0.049)** (0.050)** (0.050)**
Language 0.187 0.024 -0.008 0.223
(0.061)** (0.06) (0.061) (0.061)**
Colonial Ties 1.299 1.003 1.051 1.311
(0.121)** (0.114)** (0.114)** (0.123)**
Currency Union 1.356 1.026 1.028 1.391
(0.256)** (0.258)** (0.256)** (0.257)**
FTA 0.756 0.386 0.502 0.737
(0.222)** (0.171)* (0.160)** (0.235)**
delta (from w_hat) -- 0.716 -- --
(0.060)**
eta_hat -- 0.399 -- 0.265
(0.063)** (0.070)**
z_hat -- -- 0.611 --
(0.043)**
Observations 11,146 11,146 11,146 11,146
R-squared 0.709 -- 0.713 0.710
Notes:
All data for 1986
Exporter and Importer fixed effects
Robust standard errors (clustering by country pair)
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Dependent variable: m_ij
Table 3
26Variable T_ij - T_ji
rho_hat_ij - rho_hat_ji0.994
(0.023)**




w_hat_ij - w_hat_ji 2.073 1.820
(0.079)** (0.320)**




All data for 1986
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
m_ij - m_ji
Table 4
27